We consider the effect of money illusion -defined referring to Stevens' ratio estimation function -on the long-run Phillips curve in an otherwise standard New Keynesian model of sticky wages. We show that if households under-perceive real economic variables, negative money non-superneutralities will become more severe. On the contrary, if households over-perceive real variables, positive money nonsuperneutralities will arise. We also provide a welfare analysis of our results and we show that they are robust to the inclusion of varying capital into the model. Firms' (over-)under-perception of the real prices of production inputs (strengthens) weakens negative money non-superneutralities. In an appendix, we investigate how money illusion affects the short-run effects of a monetary shock.
Introduction
Money illusion has recently attracted renewed attention by the economics profession -see for instance the literature quoted in Tyran (2001, 2007) , which developed an experimental approach to the issue, or Cannon and Cipriani (2006) , which assessed its empirical relevance. The aim of this paper is to study how it a¤ects the long-run connection between output and in ‡ation within a DSGE model, where, similarly to the relevant literature, we de…ne the long-run as the steady-state, namely a condition characterized by the absence of temporary shocks 2 .
The way we model money illusion here builds on Stevens (1946 Stevens ( , 1951 , which has been at the centre of an extensive literature surveyed for instance in Graham (1958) , Anderson (1970) , Schepard (1981) , Luce and Krumhansl (1988) and Michell (1999) .
We consider money illusion a biased subjective way economic agents have to evaluate real variables. Suppose an individual receives two pieces of information: his/her nominal wage, W , and the general level of prices; P . S/he will have to estimate her/his real wage as a ratio of the two above on the basis of her/his ratio estimation function F = f (W; P ). Stevens conjectured that subjective values are powers of real values, so that Stevens'ratio estimation function f (W; P ) can be written as: 2 The analysis of the transitional dynamics of the system is tackled in the Appendix.
f (W; P ) =
W P
Such a distortion could arise for at least two reasons. Economic agents are often found to evaluate economic magnitudes combining real and nominal assessments, given that they have a nominal anchor and, at the same time, they are aware that nominal and real values di¤er (Sha…r et al., 1997) . Furthermore, following Pelham et al. (1994) , there might be a numerosity e¤ect, whereby people sometimes judge quantity on the basis of the number of units into which a stimulus is divided without fully considering other important variables -on this point see, for instance, Wertenbroch et al. (2007) and the literature quoted therein 3 .
We nest Stevens'original idea in an otherwise standard New Keynesian model of sticky wages with trend in ‡ation. We do so and we assume that agents do not have other behavioral/informational imperfections because only by observing money illusion in isolation from other factors one can properly assess its implications. For this very reason, it seems advisable to consider households'and …rms'money illusion separately.
The e¤ect of trend in ‡ation on output in New-Keynesian models has been the subject of a number of studies by now. Pioneering contributions on this issue were King and Wolman (1996) and Ascari (1998) . The former study considers a model with a shopping time technology and it obtains a num- 3 Both these mechanisms tend to rule out the possibility for economic agents to learn the actual value of real variables.
ber of di¤erent results, among which there is that long-run in ‡ation reduces …rms' markup, boosting the level of output. Ascari (1998) , instead, shows that in wage-staggering models money can have considerable negative nonsuperneutralities once not considering restrictively simple utility and production functions. Deveraux and Yetman (2002) focused on a menu cost model. An analysis of dynamic general equilibrium models under di¤erent contract schemes in presence of trend in ‡ation was o¤ered in Ascari (2004) . Graham and Snower (2004), instead, examined the microeconomic mechanisms underlying this class of models. In presence of Taylor wage staggering, in a monopolistically competitive labour market, they highlight three channels through which in ‡ation a¤ects output: employment cycling, labour supply smoothing and time discounting. The …rst one consists in …rms continuously shifting labour demand from one cohort to the other according to their real wage. Given that di¤erent labour kinds are imperfect substitutes, this generates ine¢ ciencies and tends to create a negative in ‡ation-output nexus.
The second one is that households demand a higher wage in presence of employment cycling given that they would prefer a smoother working time, decreasing labor supply and aggregate output. Finally under time discounting the contract wage depends more on the current (lower) level of prices than on the future (higher) level of prices and, therefore -over the contract period -the real wage will be lower the greater is the in ‡ation rate, spurring labour demand and aggregate output. The time discounting e¤ect dominates at lower in ‡ation rates, while the other two e¤ects at higher in ‡ation rates, producing a hump-shaped long-run Phillips curve. The aim of this paper is to challenge the concept of the NAIRU and the possibility to identify demand and supply shocks assuming the former ones to be temporary and the latter ones to be permanent. Graham and Snower (2004) was extended in a number of di¤erent directions. Graham and Snower (2008) showed that under hyperbolic time discounting positive money non-superneutralities are more sizeable than under exponential discounting. Vaona and Snower (2007, 2008) showed how the shape of the long-run Phillips curve depends on the shape of the production function. Finally, Vaona (2010) extended the model by Graham and Snower (2004) from the in ‡ation-output domain to the in ‡ation-real growth one.
The present contribution shows that the shape of the long-run Phillips curve changes under di¤erent degrees of money illusion. We do so by …rst assuming …rms not to be subjected to money illusion as reminiscence of Friedman (1968) . However, given that Sha…r et al. (1997) found that even …rms'decisions can be a¤ected by money illusion, we deal with this case at a later stage.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates our baseline model. We then move to its calibration and solution. Section 4 sets out our results and their underlying intuition, also providing a welfare analysis of theirs. Section 5 extends the model by considering varying capital. Section 6 considers the case of …rms'money illusion. The last section summarizes our …ndings and concludes. As mentioned above, in the appen-dix we tackle the issue of how (either households'or …rms') money illusion a¤ects the impact of a temporary monetary shock on the model, given that, even if demand shocks cannot be identi…ed on the basis of their transience, it will be interesting to study how transient demand shocks a¤ect an economy. The model here presented is inspired to those by Ascari (1998) and Graham and Snower (2004) . Firms populating the …nal perfectly competitive product market produce an homogeneous output and they minimize their total real cost subject to their production function
where W t (h) and n t (h) are respectively the nominal wage and the working time of household h, y t is output, n is the elasticity of substitution among di¤erent labour types and P t is the general level of prices, which, given that we assume perfect competition in the …nal product market, equals the price of the homogenous …nal product.
Taking …rst order conditions one can obtain the following equations
where (1) is the demand for labour services of household h and (2) is an aggregate real wage index, whereby n;t -the Lagrangian multiplier -can be
The government rebates its seigniorage proceeds to households by means of lump-sum transfers, T t (h). Therefore:
where M t (h) is money holdings of household h at time t.
Households'maximization problem
Households maximize their discounted expected utility
subject to a series of income constraints perceived as follows
where is the discount factor, E is the expectation operator, U is the utility function, c is consumption, B are private bond holdings and is the nominal interest rate. The presence of descends from the fact that economic agents are not able to properly assess real variables. The actual real budget constraint can be obtained setting = 1.
Further constraints derive form the demand for labour services (1). Note that, in this section, labour demand is not a¤ected by money illusion, notwithstanding that it involves the computation of a ratio of two nominal variables. This is so for two reasons. First, by setting di¤erent wages households can, in principle, observe the actual amount of working time that …rms demand, so it is not plausible to think that they have a misperception of labour demand.
In other words, labour demand is not computed by households, but by …rms, which in this section are not subjected to money illusion. Second, this is in accord with the very concept of money illusion. As explained by Sha…r et al.
(1997) and as brie ‡y mentioned above, money illusion arises because agents have a nominal anchor, for example their colleagues'wages. It is therefore the correct awareness of wage di¤erentials that produces a distorted perception of real variables. For these reasons, it seems appropriate not to consider any misperception in
in the present section.
The …rst order condition with respect to W t+N i (h) turns out to be particularly important for the solution of the model
where U n ( ) is the …rst derivative of U ( ) with respect to n t+i (h).
Keeping in mind that W t+i (h) is constant through the contract period, one can substitute (2) into (4) to obtain
Given that households are symmetrical and have the same …rst order condition for consumption
they will all consume the same quantity of the …nal good. So aggregating one has:
However, in each period, households belonging to di¤erent cohorts have di¤erent income levels. This implies that, following Ascari (1998), households exchange bonds to keep their consumption constant 4 . Therefore, considering that the total number of households is normalized to 1 and that there exist 1 N households in each cohort i; one has that
A …rst implication of equation (8) is that even though agents do not have a correct perception of their individual budget constraints, these hold anyway. This is thanks to the working of the market. Agents choose their preferred quantity of consumption according to (6) and they buy it spending P t c t : If they have some savings -because their nominal income exceeds their expenditure -they will use these savings to buy bonds. If, on the other hand, their nominal income is lower than their expenditure, they will sell bonds.
All these operations do not involve ratios of nominal variables and so they are not a¤ected by money illusion.
One further possible interpretation of equations (8) and (7) is that, in 4 Under this respect and regarding equation (3), the present model departs from the one by Graham and Snower (2004) , where no assumption is made regarding asset markets (see note 5 at p. 13, where it is also admitted that their model is not suitable for analysing o¤-steady state dynamics as we do in the Appendix). Consumption is thought, there, to be constant and equal to a fraction of the discounted labour income over the contract period (see equation 12). However, it is left unspeci…ed, there, how, at the beginning of the contract period, households with a low real wage can a¤ord the same level of consumption as households with a high real wage and what happens to the savings of households with a high real wage. Furthermore, the assumption of complete asset markets is customary in the new keyensian literature about nominal rigidities.
the present "right-to-manage" model, households set their wage on the basis of their distorted perceptions and …rms set working hours on the basis of the wage set by households. The production process takes then place and, …nally, households pool their income before consuming all the same quantity of output. This is why no distortion a¤ects equation (8) and why, upon consuming, the binding budget constraint is (3) with = 1 5 .
A second implication of equation (8) is that (5) can be rewritten as
which implies that money illusion a¤ects labour supply and, as explained below, the long-run Phillips curve.
Calibration and solution of the baseline model
We specify the utility function as follows
5 The author is indebted to Paolo Bertoletti for suggesting this further interpretation.
Suppose > 0, (9) will become
The equilibrium for this model is a sequence fc t ; W t (h); t ; n t (h); n t ; y t ; t g satisfying households' utility maximization and …rms' pro…t maximization.
However, we show below for the steady state that equations (1), (2) and (11) constitute an autonomous system in W W
; n 0 and y, where
and n 0 are the relative real wage of cohort zero and its labour supply respectively.
Consider, …rst, that the in ‡ation rate (equal to the growth rate of money)
is ; second, that, being the …nal product market perfectly competitive, W t = P t and, …nally, that, after (1), the labour supply of cohorts j and j + 1 are connected in the following way:
On these grounds, it is possible to solve the sums in (11) and (2) to obtain
(12) can be solved numerically for n 0 . Aggregate output can be easily obtained by substituting n 0 and (13) into (1).
Further notice that the …rst order condition with respect to bonds implies that in steady state
where R equals 1 plus the real interest rate.
We calibrate parameters as follows: N = 2, = 2; n = 5 and the real interest rate to be 4% in steady state, which means that the discount factor is pinned down by (14) . Sensitivity analyses regarding these parameters were extensively discussed and performed by Graham and Snower (2004, 2008) . It is o¤ered there also a discussion of the reasons why Taylor contracts can be preferable to other kinds of wage contracts and why inserting wage indexation may not be interesting. Furthermore, we stick to Taylor contracts because Ascari (2004) showed that they are less sensitive to trend in ‡ation than Calvo contracts. These issues will not receive further attention here.
Instead we focus on : Notice that < n not to have a negative mark-up of the reset wage over the ratio between the weighted marginal disutilities from labour and marginal utilities from consumption over the contract pe- (14) and (11) . For a given real interest rate, < 1 rises the discount factor dampening the time discounting e¤ect. Furthermore, it lowers agents' perception of their labour income reducing labour supply. > 1 instead produces opposite e¤ects. However, this does not imply that output will grow even in presence of hyperin ‡ation, given that, as it is possible to see in Figure 2 , for high in ‡ation rates positive non-superneutralities fade away (turning in the end into negative non-superneutralities).
Building on Woodford (1998) among others, we can specify agents'welfare, W, assuming the weight of money holdings to be so small to be negli-gible:
which, after Graham and Snower (2004, p.23) , in steady state can be rewritten as Table 1 shows that, varying , W behaves in a similar way to output. Under wage-staggering and = 4:9 welfare increases with the money growth rate, levelling o¤ at high in ‡ation rates. For = 0:7 welfare decreases as the in ‡ation rate increases.
The next section introduces varying capital in the model.
The model with varying capital

Households'maximization problem
where K is capital, i investment and k t+i is the nominal rental rate of capital.
Further constraints derive form the demand for labour services (1). De…ning the capital depreciation rate as , the law of motion of capital is
which can be substituted into the budget constraint to obtain
Taking the …rst-order derivative with respect to K t+i (h) one has 
Solving this problem one has that
where M C t is the real marginal cost at time t. Pro…t maximization further implies the price of the …nal product to be equal to the …rms'nominal marginal cost, which leads us to the following equation
Model solution and results
The equilibrium for this model is a sequence n t ; c t ; n t (h); n t ; t ; t ; K t ; In steady state (16) implies
In words, agents equate their perception of the real interest rate to their perception of the gross real rental rate of capital. P can be normalized to 1 and (22) together with (21) can be used to …nd W . Having the ratio between the aggregate wage index and the gross rental rate of capital, (19) and (18) can be used to …nd K=n, and, by means of the production function (17),
y=n. Further consider that in steady state i = K, therefore
In the right-hand side of equation (5) divide and multiply by n t+i to obtain
Specifying the utility function as in (10), one can …nd that, considering varying capital, (12) turns out to be
which can be solved numerically for n 0 . With n 0 at hand, on can easily recover …rst n by using (1) and then all the steady state values of the other variables of model. 
Money illusion in …rms'decisions
Up to this point, we have assumed that money illusion a¤ects households and not …rms. In this section, instead, we explore how the long-run Phillips curve is a¤ected by money illusion when it pertains to …rms'and not households'
behavior. In so doing we stick to the model with varying capital. Under this assumption = 0 and the …rst stage cost minimization problem of …rms turns out to be
The second stage cost minimization problem instead is
where f is the …rms'counterpart of :
The new …rst order conditions corresponding to equations (1) (2) and (18)- (20) can be easily computed, once recalling that under …rms' money illusion one has that n;t = Wt Pt
. Speci…cally the counterpart of equation
(1) for the present model is
Pro…t maximization still implies that the price level is equal to the nominal marginal cost and therefore that the real marginal cost is equal to one for f 6 = 0. Given that the product market is perfectly competitive, pro…ts will still be zero. The quantities of production inputs will be chosen on the basis of the distorted …rms'perceptions. The solution procedure is similar to the one illustrated in the previous section. Equation (24) changes to
Figure 4 sets out our results. f > 1 reinforces negative money nonsuperneutralities, while for f < 1 the opposite holds true. In order to understand the economic intuition, it is possible to inspect equations (25) and (26) and to see that …rms' money illusion has a similar e¤ect to an increase in the elasticity of substitution of di¤erent labour kinds, which was analysed in Ascari (1998) and Graham and Snower (2004) . This increases employment cycling and, also due to the labour supply smoothing e¤ect, leads to the results showed in Figure 4 .
Conclusions
To conclude this paper shows how the long-run in ‡ation-output nexus behaves in presence of agents mis-perceiving real economic variables. Households'under-perception reduces labour supply and time discounting leading to more negative money non-superneutralities. Households'over-perception, instead, boosts labour supply and time discounting leading to more positive money non-superneutralities. These results hold true even inserting varying capital in our model. Once considering …rms'money illusion, we found that (over-)under-perception (strengthens)weakens negative money non-superneutralities.
Also the long-run Phillips curve is more sensitive to …rms' rather than to households' money illusion. In the Appendix, we treat how a temporary shock in money growth a¤ects our model for di¤erent degrees of money illusion.
Appendix
In this Appendix we consider the impact of a temporary monetary shock on the economy. We stick to the varying capital model. We …rst analyse the case of households' money illusion and then that of …rms' money illusion.
Following Edge (2002) money growth is assumed to evolve according to the process t = ( )
where t is a random shock and an autoregressive parameter, that we set equal to 0.57 after Ascari (2004) . We also set the steady state money growth rate, , to 1%. Similarly to Edge (2001) , the other equations of the system
where (33) comes from the ratio of the …rst order condition for money holdings at time t and at time t 1. 
As noted by Ascari (2000) Under …rms'money illusion the system of equations is similar to (27) (38) with the exceptions that = 1 and that equations (27) 
(45) Figure 6 shows the impulse responses of output to a monetary shock for di¤erent values of f . Similarly to above, we normalized them on the basis of the impact value of output for f = 1. Once again money illusion does not alter output persistence. It only changes the impact value of output as a greater value of f increases it. To appreciate an intuition for this result consider that Huang and Liu (2002, 430) write that, in wage staggering models, wage-setting decisions are dominated by the labour supply smoothing e¤ect.
As a consequence, wage setting cohorts, in order to dampen ‡uctuations in their working hours, rise their wage less than in ‡ation leading to a decline in their real wage. For f > 1 …rms overperceive wage di¤erences leading to greater ‡uctuations in the working hours of the various cohorts. As a con-sequence the wage setting cohort underreact to a monetary shock leading to a greater decline in their real wage and to a greater output expansion. The contrary happens for f < 1. This intuition is con…rmed by the fact that under f = 1:1 the real wage of the resetting cohort declines by 47% more than for f = 1: On the contrary for f = 0:9 the real wage of the resetting cohort declines by 45% less than for f = 1: 
